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CHARACTERISTICS OF MOTOR CARRIER TRANSPORTATION 
OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN OKLAHOMA
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The American technological and economic expansion, the unprece­
dented population growth, and the shifting of industrial establishments 
from urban centers have been responsible for growing concern associated 
with the movement of hazardous materials. The continued movement of in­
creasing volumes of hazardous materials is evident and essential to the 
economy and general welfare of the nation's communities and people; how­
ever, potential threats to people and property exist when transportation 
systems move through heavily populated areas. The states and munici­
palities have only recently emphasized the need for broad, realistic 
controls for movement of these materials.
The American city has been vulnerable to the resulting destruc­
tion from hazardous material incidents. Regulations, when adopted, have 
been directed toward a narrow spectrum of hazardous materials or aimed 
at a broad range of chemicals too vaguely defined for adequate enforce­
ment, Additional evidence has indicated that many cities do not have 




Virtually no state, including Oklahoma and its cities, has the 
basic knowledge of what species and amounts of hazardous material moue 
through its respective jurisdictions. Only one state, California, has 
a hazardous materials reporting system for listing commodities on all 
trucks involved in highway accidents. Reporting of accidents involving 
the other modes of transportation is nonexistent except at the federal 
level.
Numerous hazardous material Incidents have occurred in Okla­
homa, and probably several hundred such accidents have occurred daily 
throughout the United States, Fortunately, only a small number of these 
incidents resulted in release of the transported commodity to cause 
death, property damage, or environmental damage. Because of various 
safety factors, standards, and other conditions of the accident, all in­
cidents have not resulted in major disasters. Accident experience sug­
gests, however, that when release of the hazardous material has occurred, 
catastrophic consequences can occur to an unsuspecting populace.
The National Safety Council has reported transportation acci­
dents as the leading cause of accidental death in the United States (T), 
In 1971, some 54,700 people were killed in vehicle accidents including 
10,000 pedestrians. In addition, there were 1,472 recreational boating 
deaths, 1,322 general aviation fatalities, 203 commercial air losses,
850 bicycle, 2,410 motorcycle, 600 railroad, 1,500 railroad crossing,
400 marine disasters, and four deaths from pipeline explosions. While 
there has been a trend toward a reduction of total automobile accidents, 
deaths tend to be increasing in other categories such as recreational 
vehicles and hazardous material transportation.
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The Torrey Canyon oil tanker which broke up off the coast of 
England in '1967 directed new attention to the need for better control 
of hazardous material transportation. The Water Quality Improvement Act 
of 1970 (2) contained a specific section entitled "Control of Hazardous 
Material". This section required the promulgation of regulations desig­
nating hazardous material. This Act gave the Environmental Protection 
Agency authority to undertake research and development aimed at giving 
those people faced with control of hazardous material spills better 
tools with which to do the job.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) under Title 49 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations has primary responsibility for transporta­
tion of hazardous materials (3). Within the framework of the DOT is the 
Hazardous Materials Regulations Board, Federal Railroad Administration, 
Federal Highway Administration, Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Adminis­
tration, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration, and Interstate Commerce Commission. With 
the creation of the DOT in 1965, the Interstate Commerce Commission was 
stripped of its transportation safety regulations and left with the 
powers to regulate interstate commerce. The Bureau of Motor Carrier 
Safety, Bureau of Railroad Safety, Bureau of Pipeline Safety, and the 
Coast Guard have been delegated the enforcement agencies for the trans­
portation of hazardous materials for each mode. The Hazardous Materials 
Regulation Board has been given the responsibility to promulgate the 
rules and regulations governing transportation of hazardous materials.
The Oklahoma Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS) has authori­
ty over all motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce in Oklahoma.
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Caldwell (4) has stated that only one BMCS inspector is available for 
the majority of Oklahoma, and that actual surveillance and inspection 
of motor carriers on the highway occurs about 8 hours per week.
The Oklahoma Bureau of Railroad Safety (BRS) has authority to
regulate rail shipments of hazardous materials. One inspector has been 
assigned to inspect and enforce the DOT regulations for railroads in the 
State of Oklahoma. Moore (5) commented that the BRS investigated rail 
accidents if $50,000 property damage occurred, if death or serious in­
jury resulted, or if conditions existed which warranted special investi­
gation. Few of these kinds of accidents have occurred in Oklahoma dur­
ing the past 2 years.
The Coast Guard has regulatory authority for all inland water
traffic in addition to coastline movement by ship or barge. The Coast
Guard regulations govern construction and safety requirements of ships, 
tankers, and barges including port facilities. The Coast Guard investi­
gates all waterway accidents and assists in recovery and cleanup opera­
tions (6).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, has also been involved in hazardous 
material transportation. The EPA has lead responsibility for in-plant 
spills and spills threatening a water course. Hazardous material inci­
dents not involving a water course are generally not investigated by the 
EPA.
The Council for Environmental Quality has been directed under 
the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 to establish a Nation­
al Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan (?). This plan estab-
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lishad an organization for handling spills beyond the capabilities of 
regional or local authorities. The primary agencies involved in the 
plan have been the Environmental Protection Agency, Council on Environ­
mental Quality, Department of Commerce, Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, Department of Defense, Department of Interior, Department 
of Transportation, Department of Justice, Office of Emergency Prepared­
ness, and the Department of State,
Hess (S) reported that only California, Florida, Maine, Mary­
land, and Washington have developed a spill contingency plan, Hanson 
(9) stated that the Oklahoma Pollution Control Department has completed 
a contingency plan for Oklahoma to compliment the EPA's Oil and Hazard­
ous Substance Contingency Plan for Region l/I.
The storage, manufacturing, distribution, and selling of ex­
plosive material comes under the auspices of the Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (ATT) Division of the United States Treasury Department, The 
Oklahoma ATF division has responsibility in licensing dealers to sell, 
and manufacturers to make and sell explosive commodities (10), Ex­
plosions that have occurred with intent to commit a crime are investi­
gated by the ATF, A recent explosion of a truck transporting explo­
sives near Joplin, Missouri, in 1971, killing the driver and a passing 
motorist, was investigated by the ATF division from the Tulsa regional 
office (11),
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 (12) was 
designed primarily to insure a safe and healthful working environment 
for all working men and woman. Hazardous materials used within the work 
environment are specifically regulated to protect.the health and safety
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of the workers. There have been overlapping areas of authority between 
the Department of Labor regulations under OSHA and the Department of 
Transportation regulations for the BMCS. It has not been specifically 
determined if a motor carrier involved in an accident reports to the 
DOT or to OSHA. Caldwell (4) has suggested that motor carriers involved 
in accidents report to both agencies.
Several Oklahoma State agencies have regulations regarding the 
transportation of hazardous materials. The Corporation Commission has 
regulations requiring transporters of passengers or property for hire to 
obtain a Corporation Commission permit. Rule 15 (a) of the Motor Car­
rier regulations states that:
. no motor carrier shall transport deleterious liquids or 
substances harmful to livestock, soil, or crops, including, but 
not limited, to salt water, tank bottoms, and similar substances 
transported for disposal or otherwise in any quantity above 
twenty gallons, without having first secured a Deleterious Sub­
stance License" (13).
The rule further states that dumping or disposal of any deleterious sub­
stance must be approved by the Corporation Commission.
According to the minutes of the Pollution Control Coordinating 
Board Task Force meeting of August 28, 1972, the disposal and movement 
of hazardous substances in Oklahoma should be regulated by a single 
agency (14). Three state agencies have authority to license disposal of 
waste substances, the Corporation Commission for salt water disposal, 
Oklahoma Department of Pollution Control for deep well disposal of in­
dustrial waste and the Oklahoma State Health Department for septic tank 
pumpings. The adoption of a single regulation governing all hazardous 
material disposal within the framework of one agency was referred to a 
future meeting*
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The Department of Public Safety (OPS) has not been directly 
responsible for transportation of hazardous materials in Oklahoma but 
is more concerned with the equipment and safety requirements of vehi­
cles, gross weights, and measurements. In the event of an accident in­
volving hazardous materials, the highway troopers have traditionally 
been the first on the scene. The trooper has the responsibility to de­
termine the hazard involved, contact the proper authorities, and estab­
lish roadblocks if necessary. The explosives truck that crashed and 
exploded near Okemah on November 17, 1972, was an example of quick 
response by the trooper. On the assumption that the truck contained a 
bomb, the trooper rerouted traffic many miles around the scene until 
the true danger was assessed (15).
Installation and storage of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) in 
Oklahoma is regulated by the Oklahoma Liquified Petroleum Gas Commis­
sion. The LPG Commission licenses installers of LPG appliances, licenses 
storage facilities, and license vehicles transporting LPG in Oklahoma.
The LPG Commission is also prepared to train local fire departments in 
Oklahoma on the methods of fighting LPG fires and assist in recovery of 
LPG involved in an accident (15).
The authority to regulate any condition considered hazardous to 
public health, including the movement of certain hazardous materials in 
Oklahoma, comes under the authority of the Oklahoma State Health Depart­
ment (DSHD). Specifically, the DSHD regulates the use, storage, trans­
portation, and disposal of radioisotopes; however, the DSHD Environmen­
tal Health Division has been studying disposal locations for hazardous 
materials.
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Besides the federal explosives regulations, the Oklahoma State 
Fire Marshal's (OSFM) office has adopted, as of Duly 1, 1971, the State 
of Oklahoma Explosives Control Law (17), The Fire Marshal has been 
given power to regulate anyone manufacturing, selling, transporting for 
hire, or storing explosives and blasting agents in the state of Okla­
homa. A permit system has been adopted by OSFM for anyone handling ex­
plosive items in Oklahoma.
The OSFM explosive control regulations have, in addition, 
adopted the DOT requirements for transporting explosive agents via 
roads, railroads, and waterways. The regulation does not, however, 
regulate other than explosive agents or certain chemicals stored in con­
junction with blasting agents.
The City of Oklahoma City, in March, 1972, adopted the American
Insurance Association Fire Prevention Code (IB). This ordinance has
regulated tank storage of hazardous materials, container, and portable
tank storage of hazardous materials, container and portable tank storage,
tank vehicles, and liquified petroleum gas. Article 20, Section 20 has
a specific section for hazardous material and chemicals as follows:
A permit shall be required for the storage or handling of more 
than 55 gallons of corrosive liquids, or more than 50 pounds of 
oxidizing materials, or more than 10 pounds of organic perox­
ides' or more than 500 pounds of nitromathane; or 1000 pounds 
or more o,' Ammonium Nitrate, Ammonium Nitrate fertilizers and 
fertilizer mixtures defined in Section 20,10 (a) or any amount 
of highly toxic material or poisonous gas.
The ordinance has further required that anyone transporting hazardous
materials within the city limits of Oklahoma City first obtain a permit
from the City Fire Marshal's Office, According to Koch (19), no permit
has been issued for movement of hazardous materials within Oklahoma City
9
since the adoption of the ordinance.
The Oklahoma State Civil Defense (OSCO) agency has authority 
under the Oklahoma Civil Defense and Emergency Resources Management Act 
of 1957 (20) to declare an emergency in the event of a serious accident 
with hazardous materials. In 1970, a tank car derailment near Wetumka, 
Oklahoma, threatened the community with release of toxic gases. The 
OSCD mobilized the police, fire, and National Guard units to evacuate 
the town until the hazard could be eliminated (21),
The Civil Defense agencies throughout the state maintain a con­
stant surveillance of police broadcasting networks. According to Mitchell 
(22), the Oklahoma City Civil Defense agency has the only 24-hour moni­
toring of police and emergency broadcasting systems in central Oklahoma.
The Oklahoma Safety Council (OSC) has been the central clearing­
house for information regarding many areas of public safety. Accident 
statistics are assimilated for Oklahoma and the United States and are 
made available to interested agencies. The OSC also works with public 
agencies in organization of safety programs such as storage, handling, 
and USB of hazardous materials (23),
Hazardous Materials 
The Code of Federal Regulations on hazardous materials (3) 
separates hazardous materials into six categories for identification: 
explosives, flammable liquids, flammable solids and oxidizing materials, 
acids and corrosives, compressed gases, and poisonous and radiological 
materials. The regulations list over 1,200 specific hazardous materials 
and specify packing and shipping requirements, labeling necessary and 
maximum quantity that can be shipped for each item.
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Sonnenburg (24) explained that the degree of hazard with each 
material is different according to the kind and amount involved. He 
went on to say that accidents have occurred releasing only small 
amounts of liquid parathion causing serious hazards, and accidents with 
other chemicals may require several hundred gallons before hazards ex­
ist.
According to Attaway (25), the following chemicals are re­
leased into the United States environment annually:
a) 1.7 million pounds of sulfuric acid
b) 3.2 million pounds industrial alcohols
c) 3.4 million pounds fertilizer solution
d) 44,000 thousand pounds of phenol
e) 2-3 million gallons industrial waste
f) 360,000 pounds acetone
g) 600,000 pounds various monomers
h) 3 million pounds organic chemicals
i) 19,000 pounds especially toxic chemicals (pesticides)
j) 2 billion gallons mining wastes
The above figures have included estimates on both inplant spills and . 
transportation losses.
Production of hazardous materials has had significant increases 
annually. The Department of Transportation, U. S. Coast Guard, indica­
ted over 500 new chemicals developed yearly (26). DOT (27) (Table 1) 
has compiled production figures for ten classifications of hazardous 
materials produced in 1968-69. This figure shows that well over 2 















Material 1,620,000 2,420,000 50 3.8
Compressed Gas 508,000 1,067,000 110 7.0
Explosives 20,000 40,000 100 6.5
Corrosive
Material 45,100 95,900 112 7.1
Oxidizing
Agents 7,800 19,400 149 8.5




Material 36,000 92,000 156 8.9
Radioactive
Material 170 163 860 22.8
Molten
Material 13,000 41,000 215 15.0
Total 2,258,900 3,778,100 67
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increase to nearly 4 billion tons is expected by 1979-BO,
The National Transportation Safety Board (27) revealed that 
between 1958-1968 the yearly increase for all classifications, except 
flammable materials, has been greater than the annual growth rate of the 
real Gross National Product (4.4 per cent), A 10-year projected growth 
rate of hazardous materials production was approximately 1,5 times 
greater than the Gross National Product growth rate,
McConnaughey et al, (28) have provided in Figure 1 a comparison 
of chemical production to population growth between 1958 and 1968, Or­
ganic chemical production more than doubled, inorganic about doubled, 
petroleum increased 40 per cent while the population increased only 15 
per cent.
Fallwell (29) pointed out that total chemical production regis­
tered only a small percentage increase in 1971, Table 2 lists the top 
50 chemicals produced in 1971 with an overall increase over 1970 of 
about 1 per cent.
The combined production of all synthetic organic chemicals, 
tars, tar crudes, and crude products from petroleum and natural gas in 
1970 was 233,110 million pounds, an increase of 4,2 per cent over the 
input in 1969 as shown in Table 3 (30), The total marketed production 
of crude oil and natural gas in Oklahoma and certain other states for 
selected years are reviewed in Table 4 and Table 5. Production has in­
creased for the selected years both in Oklahoma and the United States 
(31, 32),
The American Petroleum Institute has reported that the domestic 
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Figure 1.--Growth in Population and Chemical Production, 1958-60,
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1 Sulfuric acid, total 58.57 59.15 59.07 35.70
2 Ammonia, synthetic 
anhydrous 27.44 26.20 25.84 10.41
3 Oxygen, high and low 
purity 25.94 27,30 26.91 9.52
4 Sodium hydroxide, 
100# liquid 19.37 20.15 19.83 9.83
5 Chlorine, gas 18.68 19.51 18.83 9.20
5 Ethylene 18.30 18.50 16.44 5.66
7 Sodium carbonate, syn­
thetic and natural 14.28 14.03 14.07 10.60
8 Nitric acid, total 13.34 12.92 12.89 6.76
9 Ammonium nitrate, 
original solution 13.17 12.37 11.78 8.47
10 Phosphoric acid, total 12.07 10.93 10.75 4.51
11 Nitrogen, high and low 
purity 11.91 10.96 9.62 1.94
12 Benzene 7.56 8.31 8.69 3.91
13 Ethylene dichloride 7.15 7.46 8,04 1.37
14 Polyethylene, high and 
low density 8.40 5.81 5.49 1.61
15 Toluene 6.21 6.01 5,50 1.86
16 Urea, primary solution 6.14 6.50 5.95 1.83
17 Propylene 5i56 6.99 7,24 2.67
18 Methanol, synthetic 5.01 4.93 4.21 2.04
19 Ethylbenzene 4.83 4.83 4.91 1.94
20 Ammonium sulfate 4.65 4.99 5.13 3.09
21 Styrene 4.41 4.34 4.65 1.76
22 Formaldehyde 4.37 4.43 4.40 1.75
23 Xylene, total 4.35 3.88 2.75 1.85
24 Vinyl chloride 4.19 4.04 3.74 1.04









Billions of Pounds 
1970 1969 1961
26 Ethylene oxide 3.61 3.86 3.41 1.36
27 Polyvinyl chloride 
and copolymers 3.44 3.12 3.03 0.98
28 Butadiene (1.3-), 
rubber grade 3.05 3.11 3.12 1.91
29 Carbon black 3.03 2.93 2.96 1.98
29 Ethylene glycol 3.03 3.04 2.57 1.18
31 Sodium sulfate, high 
and low purity 2.70 2.72 2.95 2.34
32 Carbon dioxide, all 
forms 2.52 2.23 2.33 1.82
33 Polystyrene, straight 
and rubber-mofified 2.44 2.37 2.21 0.74
34 Calcium chloride, solid 
and liquid 2.37 2.42 2.35 1.69
35 Aluminum sulfate, com­
mercial 2.26 2.35 2.49 1.78
36 Cumene 2.10 1.98 1.69 0.29
37 Sodium tripolyphosphate 2.08 2.38 2.48 1.51
38 Acetic acid 2.05 1.93 1.77 0.76
39 Ethanol, synthetic 1.96 1.96 2.36 1.68
40 Isopropanol 1.82 1.92 2.03 1.19
41. Phenol, total 1.74 1.76 1.69 0.78
42 Cyclohexane 1.73 1.84 2.23 0.70
43 Acetone 1.64 1.62 1.52 0.75
44 Acetaldehyde 1.61 1.61 1.65 na
45 Acetic anhydride 1.55 1.59 1.68 1.26
46 Dimethyl terephthalate 1.50 1.45 1.54 na
47 Terephihalic acid 1.50 1.33 1.05 na
48 Titanium dioxide 1.30 1.31 1.32 1.01
49 Polypropylene 1.25 1.03 1.09 0.10

















Grand Total 223,584 233,110 4.2
Tar 7,588 . 7,509 — 1*0
Tar Crudes 9,995 9,300 - 7.0
Crude Prod, from
Petroleum and Natural Gas 71,315 77,879 9.2
Synthetic Organic
Chemicals 134,685 138,322 2.7
Cyclics 28,571 28,257 - 1.1
Dyes 240 235 - 2.4
Organic Pigment 51 57 - 7.4
Medicines 200 214 7.2
Flavors and Perfumes 120 100 -15.7
Plastic and Resins Material 18,557 19,210 3.5
Rubber Processing Chemicals 303 298 - 1.7
Elastomers 4,524 4,438 - 1.9
Plasticizers 1,382 1,335 - 3.3
Surface-Active Agents 3,901 3,885 - .4
Pesticides and Related 1,104 1,034 - 5.4
Miscellaneous Chemicals 75,720 79,257 4.7
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TABLE 4






Alabama 8,030 7,348 7,635 7,701
Alaska 14,358 29,126 65,204 73,953
Arizona 132 2,924 3,370 2,433
Arkansas 23,824 21,075 19,464 18,049
California 345,295 359,219 375,496 375,291
Colorado 33,492 33,905 31,937 28,294
Florida 1,799 1,568 1,474 1,731
Illinois 61,661 59,142 56,391 50,391
Indiana 10,617 10,081 8,692 7,841
Kansas 103,738 99,200 94,505 88,716
Kentucky 18,066 15,535 14,036 12,924
Louisiana 674,318 774,527 817,426 844,603
Michigan 14,273 13,664 12,974 12,213
Mississippi 55,227 57,147 58,708 64,283
Missouri 97 75 65 67
Montana 35,380 34,959 48,460 45,954
Nebraska 13,850 13,373 13,183 12,106
Nevada 307 279 271 223
New Mexico 124,154 126,144 128,550 129,227
New York 1,735 1,972 1,532 1,256
North Dakota 27,126 25,315 25,040 22,703
Ohio 10,899 9,924 11,204 10,972
Oklahoma 224,839 230,749 223,623 224,729
Pennsylvania 4,337 4,387 4,160 4,448
South Dakota 239 211 187 158
Tennessee 7 7 6 32
Texas 1,057,706 1,119,962 1,133,380 1,151,775
Utah 24,112 24,048 23,504 23,295
Virginia 1 3 3 1
Washington 0 0 0 0
West Virginia 3,575 3,561 3,312 3,104
Wyoming 134,470 136,312 144,250 154,945
Other States 0 0 0 0
Total United States 3,027,763 3,215,742 3,329,042 3,371,751
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TABLE 5






Alaska 7,255 11,267 14,438 17,343
Arkansas 82,831 105,174 116,522 156,627
California 660,384 689,607 687,080 714,893
Colorado 126,381 136,667 116,857 121,424
Illinois 7,396 7,230 5,144 4,380
Indiana 239 215 198 234
Kansas 793,379 847,495 871,971 835,555
Kentucy 78,976 76,536 89,168 89,024
Louisiana 4,466,786 5,081,435 5,716,857 6,416,015
Maryland 408 696 621 864
Michigan 34,558 34,120 33,589 40,480
Mississippi 166,825 156,652 139,497 135,051
Montana 28,105 30,635 25,966 19,313
Nebraska 10,720 10,196 8,453 8,129
New Mexico 937,205 998,076 1,067,510 1,164,182
New York 3,340 2,699 8,837 4,632
North Dakota 35,652 46,585 40,462 41,023
Ohio 35,684 43,133 41,315 42,673
Oklahoma 1,320,995 1,351,225 1,412,952 1,390,884
Pennsylvania 84,461 90,914 89,966 87,987
Texas 6,636,555 6,953,790 7,188,900 7,495,414
Utah 46,151 48,965 69,366 71,616
Virginia 3,152 4,249 3,818 3,389
West Virginia 207,416 211,610 211,460 236,971
Wyoming 235,849 243,381 240,070 248,481
Other States 3,585 3,625 1,068 1,281
Total United States 16,042,753 17,206,628 18,171,325 19,322,400
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an increase of 3.2 per cent over 1970. The total United States produc­
tion of crude oil during 1971 was 3,329,600,000 barrels, a drop of 0,6 
per cent as compared to 1970. The significant factor was the 25,8 per 
cent increase in crude oil imports to make up the difference in supply 
and demand (33). Table 6, taken from the American Petroleum report of 
supply and demand of crude oil products, has suggested an increased role 
for the transportation industry.
Waterway Transportation 
In 1967, an estimated 414 million tons of hazardous materials 
were shipped via water carriers according to reports by the National 
Transportation Safety Board (27), This constituted approximately 23 per 
cent of the total quantity of hazardous materials shipped in the United
States. This figure is expected to be 470 million tons by 1980, a 13,5
per cent increase. Approximately 17 per cent of all crude petroleum 
products were shipped via water carriers in 1971, Petroleum products 
constituted 84 per cant of all hazardous materials shipped,
U, S, News and World Report (34) reported that in 1971, there
were 20,000 barges on the 26,000 miles of inland and coastal waterways 
of the United States, The U, S, Maritime Administration figures in 
Table 7 indicate a 23,8 per cent decrease in U, S. merchant vessels from 
1968 to 1970 (35), However, the world merchant vessel population has 
increased 3,1 per cent during the same period.
In 1970, there were over 300 billion ton miles of freight along 
United States waterways, an increase of 58 per cent over 1960, A 50 per 
cent increase in water traffic has been projected for the next 10 years 
(34), In Table 8, the total ton-railas of freight on the five waterway
TABLE 6
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1970 Average 1971 Average Change
Exports: Total 94,458 259 81,400 223 13.9
Total Demand 5,458,931 14,956 5,616,400 15,387 2.9
Unaccounted for Crude -7,721 -21 -6,100 -17 -19.0
Crude Oil Losses 4,328 12 4,461 12
Net Processing Gain 131,052 359 142,100 389 8.9
Total Change in Stock 37,738 103 39,139 107
Total Stock December 31 1,017,861 1,057,000
TABLE 7


















United States 195 23 1511 22 53 23 312 19 2071 22
Foreign 794 20 10357 14 2556 8 3583 10 17290 12
1960 World Total 989 20 11868 15 2609 9 3895 11 19351 13
United States 171 25 1076 23 38 25 294 19 1579 22
Foreign 724 20 10823 13 2916 8 3938 10 18401 12




FREIGHT CARRIED ON INLAND WATERWAYS BY SYSTEM
1950 - 1970
System 1950 1955




Atlantic Coast Rivers 5,497 27,042 28,583 27,781 25,938 26,603 28,572
Gulf Coast Rivers 1,229 13,860 16,932 21,808 25,757 27,808 28,582
Pacific Coast Rivers 1,686 4,736 6,001 6,630 7,303 8,061 8,397
Mississippi River System 33,598 52,019 69,257 96,593 120,339 125,195 138,534
Great Lakes System 120,334 118,850 99,480 109,609 112,073 115,235 114,475
Total 163,344 216,508 220,253 262,421 291,409 302,901 318,560
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systems of the United States increased dramatically. The Mississippi 
River system, including the Arkansas River of Oklahoma, showed a 11,5 
per cent increase in traffic from 1969 to 1970 (36),
The water carrier industry has met the challenge of the in­
creasing chemical production by constructing gigantic oil and chemical 
tankers with capacity over 2,5 million gallons and weighing up to
400,000 tons (37), These carriers have plied the waters of the world 
carrying potential catastrophic accidents. Water carrier accident ex­
perience with projection to 1980 by Booz-Allen has been included in 
Table 9 (27), These figures have suggested that by 1980, 77 per cent 
of all water carrier accidents will involve hazardous materials.
Notable accidents involving death and property damage have oc­
curred in the transportation of hazardous materials via water carriers. 
The most devastating was the Texas City explosion on April 16, 1947, 
According to the acounts of the Daily Oklahoman (38), a French freight­
er, Grandcamp, was loading ammonium nitrate at the Monsanto Chemical 
Corporation docks. Late in the afternoon of the 16th the ship caught 
fire, attracting numerous onlookers. At 9:13 P.M., the ship exploded 
and completely vanished. The crew, firemen, and onlookers were all 
killed. The force of the blast was felt 150 miles away. A second 
nitrate-loaded barge moored in the harbor also caught fire, consequently 
exploding at 1:08 A.M., April 17th, killing many more rescuers and fire­
men.
The Monsanto Company was completely destroyed in addition to 
two nearby oil refineries. The death toll stood at 468 dead, 302 miss­
ing and presumed dead, and 2,000 injured. Property damage was in excess
TABLE g
DOMESTIC WATER CARRIER ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE 1957 - 1968
Domestic Waterborne 
Traffic 













1957 480 — — - -
1958 429 - - - -
1959 461 - - - -
1960 476 - - - -
1961 463 - - - -
1962 474 - - - -
1963 478 - - - -
1964 487 1,625 237 3.3 0.5
1965 489 1,685 384 3.5 0.8
1966 505 1,569 387 3.1 0.8
1967 505 1,783 433 3.5 0.9




With the advent of large oil tanker ships, an increasing num­
ber of tanker accidents have occurred during the last decade. The loss 
of wildlife and property damage are the main results of oil spills. 
Moffitt and Orr (39) reported 5,600 seabirds killed off the California 
coast in 1937 when an oil tanker broke up. Hawkes (40) estimated that 
in 1961, 250,000 breeding colonies of seabirds were lost off Newfound­
land by oil spills. Beer (41) stated that the 1967 Torrey Canyon inci­
dent resulted in 30,000 bird deaths.
Aldrich (42) listed tanker groundings causing 17 spills and 
238 tanker collisions from Dune, 1964 through April, 1967, in navigable 
waters off England. The U. S. Coast Guard (43) reported 690 tanker and 
tank barge collisions in navigable waters of the United States during 
the fiscal year 1971.
The Arkansas Waterway has created a new dimension in transpor­
tation for Oklahoma. Numerous accidents involving hazardous materials 
have occurred on the Mississippi River system, indicating potential 
problems for cities and people living along the Arkansas. The WYCHEM 
112 Chlorine barge which sank near Natchez, Mississippi in 1961, could 
have endangered the lives and property of people living many miles from 
the scene, if the deadly chlorine gas had been released (44).
The petroleum transportation industry has designed huge 24,000 
cubic meter liquified natural gas (LNG) tankers to meet the growing 
energy needs of the United States. The Coast Guard theorize that in­
stant vaporization of that amount of LNG in New York Harbor could have 
an explosive range greater than New York City (45).
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Railroad Transportation 
A second important mods of transportation of hazardous mater­
ials has bean the railroads, Tha rail transport systems have unique
qualities from other modes of transportation because of the fixed nature 
of the system. Slight variations in the system, particularly in the 
track, has caused serious derailments.
O’Driscoll (46) reported over 2 million carloads of chemicals
and petroleum products handled by rail in 1970. This represented over
40 per cent of all hazardous materials produced. He has indicated four 
problems encountered by the rail transportation of hazardous materials. 
First, the amounts of materials spilled vary from a tea cup quantity to 
tank losses of 8,000 to 48,000 gallons. Secondly, spills can involve 
any of thousands of hazardous materials carried by rail. A single 
material or a variety of materials have been involved in a single inci­
dent, Third, accidents within the rail systems frequently have occurred 
in remote, inaccessable locations. This type of situation has made 
cleanup and removal difficult. Fourth, incidents involving a small 
leak in one tank car have lead to catastrophic chain reactions.
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) investigated 91 rail­
road accidents in 1971. Hazardous materials were involved in 21 of the 
wrecks which represents 23 per cent of the total accidents. A summary 
of 1969-1971 accident data has been accumulated in Table 10 (47). In a 
separate report by the FRA, it has been shown that 20.6 per cent of all 
crossing accidents in the United States in 1970 involved a truck (48).
In Oklahoma, trucks were involved in 16,1 per cent of all crossing acci­
dents (see Table 11).
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TABLE 10
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION INVESTIGATED RAILROAD 
ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE - 1969 AND 1970
Collisions 82
Derailments 97













Miscellaneous and Others 16
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TABLE 11
UNITED STATES AND OKLAHOMA CASUALTIES IN ACCIDENTS AT 





Truck struck by train 572 222 409
Truck into side of train 162 46 143
Total truck - train 734 268 552
Total all crossings
accidents 3,559 1,440 3,336
Oklahoma:
Total truck - train 17 3 17
Total all crossings 
accidents 69 20 65
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Several rail accidents have occurred exemplifying the potent­
ial problems of hazardous material transportation. On January 25, 1969, 
a Southern Railroad train derailed at Laurel, Mississippi. Derailed 
were 14 loaded liquified petroleum gas tank cars (49). The tank cars 
were damaged and violent explosions and fires occurred 40 minutes after 
the incident. Pieces of tank cars were hurled 1,600 feet from the 
wreck, igniting dwellings and commercial buildings. Extensive property 
damage occurred to other nearby structures from the concussion of the
blast. A tank car of hydrocyanic acid was not damaged, but if it had
ruptured, widespread death from toxic gas could have resulted. A total 
of 55 residences were destroyed and 1,350 residences sustained damage. 
Damage was also reported by six schools and five churches. Two fatali­
ties resulted from the fires and 33 persons were hospitalized. Total 
damage was estimated at $3,000,000,
A second train derailment occurred at Dunreith, Indiana, Janu­
ary 1, 1968, at 9:30 P.M. (50). Derailed were five tanks cars containing
20,000 gallons each of the following: two cars of acetone cyanohydrin
and one each of vinyl chloride, ethylene oxide, and methyl methacrylate. 
An explosion and fire resulted with evolution of toxic gases. The tank 
car of cyanohydrin contaminated the adjacent stream causing death of 
farm animals and fish. The cyanide compound also leached into the 
aquifer contaminating the towns drinking water supply. Forty-five 
minutes after the derailment the ethylene oxide tank exploded and car­
ried the entire 1,600 pound tank car BOO feet into a residential area. 
Damage to 94 homes and businesses amounted to over $1,000,000. No 
deaths occurred and only minor injuries were reported by firemen.
The Dunrieth cannery was located adjacent to the accident site. 
The cannery was completely destroyed, but the potential consequences 
were minimized by the fact that the accident occurred on New Year's Day, 
a holiday.
A third example of rail accidents involving hazardous materials 
occurred in Houston, Texas, October 19, 1971, as reported by the Tulsa 
Daily World (51), A Missouri Pacific freight train derailed piling up 
16 cars. Among the 15 cars were six 48,D00=gallon tank cars of vinyl 
chloride, three of fuel oil, one acetone, one butadiene, and one for­
maldehyde, One of the vinyl chloride tank cars was punctured and igni­
ted, The Houston Fire Department responded to the scene within a few 
minutes and attempted to contain the blaze. Forty-five minutes after the 
derailment, a second vinyl chloride car exploded killing one fireman and 
seriously burning 37 other people. Large sections of the tank car were 
found 400 feet from the accident site,
Greer (52) stated that the facts of the Houston derailment have 
not been released pending litigation in the courts. The results, how­
ever, have suggested that even the most sophisticated fire departments 
can not adequately handle hazardous material incidents.
Still another type of incident involving hazardous material on 
railroads occurred at Crete, Nebraska, February 18, 1969, at 6:30 A.M. 
(53), A Chicago Burlington and Quincy train derailed, fracturing three 
anhydrous ammonia tank cars and releasing some 29,300 gallons of the 
chemical. At normal atmospheric pressure, the anhydrous ammonia vapo­
rized to ammonia gas and blanketed the entire area. The ammonia cloud 
drifted into the town of Crete killing seven persons on the streets and
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seriously injuring 53 others.
Air Transportation 
The National Transportation Safety Board (54) reported a total 
of 355 accidents involving aerial application of agricultural chemicals 
for 1969. A total of 35 pilots were killed and 52 seriously injured. 
Extremely toxic chemicals were involved in 42 per cent of the accidents. 
In 40 per cent of the accidents, the aircraft was carrying "nontoxic" 
chemicals and 10 per cent were carrying unknown chemicals. Pilot error
caused 80 per cent of all aerial applicator accidents. From the avail­
able statistics it could not be determined how much of the material was 
lost due to the accident and how cleanup operations were handled. Near­
ly all aerial applicator accidents occurred in rural, sparsely populated 
areas. Agricultural activities were responsible for 90 per cent of the 
applicator accidents.
Ferrarase (55) remarked that "there have been no accidents in 
air transportation of hazardous materials; therefore, we have no data or 
statistics on accidents involving these materials," However, the Daily
Oklahoman (56) reported a Delta Airline passenger flight from Houston
to Atlanta on January 12, 1972, was contaminated with radioactive mater­
ial. The contamination occurred when a container of radioactive material 
leaked in the baggage compartment of the aircraft. A total of 917 pass­
engers were potentially exposed before the leak was detected. No in­
juries from the incident were reported.
Still another incident involved an Eastern Airlines passenger 
aircraft at Louisville, Kentucky (57), Material described on the way­
bill as "ten metal shipping drums of precious metal solution," leaked
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onto the cargo bin flooring of the aircraft. Holes up to 8 inches in 
diameter were burned into the flooring. It was later described as 
hydrochloric acid solutions. The drums contained four times the maximum 
allowable corrosive liquid for cargo aircraft and 40 times maximum per­
mitted for passenger aircraft. This accident has suggested that the 
wording on the bill of lading may be deceiving and not representing the 
actual cargo being shipped.
Pipeline Transportation 
The annual report of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines (58) in­
dicated that 46.B per cent of all crude petroleum and petroleum products 
were carried by pipelines, 23.25 per cent by water carriers, 28,22 per 
cent by motor carriers, and 1.62 per cent by railroad (see Table 12). 
Pipelines also handled 17 per cent of all chlorine transported which 
equaled 4.25 million tons in 1971 (59). Chlorine distribution by trans­
portation mode is indicated in Table 13.
Pipeline accidents have decreased 30 per cent from 1968 to 
1970 (50). Liquid pipeline operators reported 499 accidents in 1958,
403 in 1969, and 347 in 1970, Property damage amounted to $899,228 in 
1970 compared to $1,347,509 in 1968.
The Office of Pipeline Safety figures revealed Oklahoma as 
second only to Texas in number of pipeline accidents (61), Oklahoma had 
39 accidents in 1959 and 38 in 1970, Texas ranked first both years with 
139 and 121, respectively. Table 14 summarizes pipeline accidents show­
ing few deaths having occurred in 1970,
Thayer (52) announced that on December 9, 1970, in Franklin 
County, Missouri, a propane pipeline ruptured. After leaking for 1
TABLE 12
TOTAL CRUDE PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 







Carriers Motor Carriers 







1938 139 39.28 138 38.86 21 5.8 57 16.06 354
1943 196 41.46 116 24.49 76 16.14 85 17.91 474
1948 262 38.24 238 34.51 121 17.62 65 9.53 686
1953 359 41.63 273 31.70 185 21.40 45 5.27 863
1958 433 42.57 300 29.36 252 24.78 33 3.29 1017
1959 464 43.22 310 28.86 267 24.82 33 3.10 1074
1960 468 43.01 318 29.22 270 24.83 32 2.94 1089
1961 484 43.60 323 29.06 274 24.64 30 2.70 1110
1962 502 43.36 330 28.46 298 25.69 . 29 2.49 1159
1963 521 43.57 336 28.06 313 26.14 27 2.23 1196
1964 559 44.54 322 25.63 347 27.65 27 2.18 1255
1965 588 44.43 323 24.47 385 29.14 26 1.96 1323
1966 630 44.81 333 23,68 417 29.67 26 1.84 1405
1967 679 45.64 350 23.50 434 29.13 26 1.73 1488
1968 726 46.47 361 23.09 450 28.16 26 1.68 1563









Ton Containers and 
Cylinders 127,000 3
Tank Trucks 42,000 1
Total 4,250,000 100
TABLE 14






Loss of Commodity 
(Barrels)
Corrosion - Ext. 149 42.8 — 5 68,421 45,232
Equipment Rupturing Line 70 20.2 1 3 119,900 80,121
Defect Pipe Stem 29 8.4 - - 12,500 40,174
Corrosion - Int. 30 8.7 - 10 345,380 15,616
Carrier Personnel 13 3.8 2 - 16,336 26,804
Previous Damaged Pipe 5 1.4 - - 18,200 1,410
Ualve 3 0.9 - - 682 3,470
Relief Equipment 3 0.9 1 3 ' 135,000 12,803
Defective Metal 3 0.9 - - 800 995
Gasket 11 3.2 - - 2,754 3,112
Defective Weld 3 0.9 - - 400 984
Flood 1 0.3 - - 160 2,500
Surge 7 2.0 - - 1,956 5,737
Miscellaneous 20 5.6 - - 176,739 282,891
Totals 347 100.0 4 21 899,228 521,849
03en
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hour, an explosion resulted destroying all buildings in the immediate 
vicinity. Thirteen other homes were damaged within a 2-mile radius of 
the explosion. On the 10th of December a second explosion occurred 
from the escaped propane lying in low valleys around the rupture site. 
The force of the second blast equaled 100,000 pounds of TNT or about 750 
barrels of propane. No deaths resulted but ten people were, injured. A 
seismograph 50 miles away recorded the shock,
A second pipeline accident as reviewed by Thayer (62), occurred 
September 2, 1970, at Oacksonville, Maryland. A 30-inch petroleum pipe­
line from Houston to New Oersey sprang a leak and contaminated the local 
water supply. An explosion occurred, injuring five people before the 
leak was discovered and repaired.
Motor Carrier Transportation 
The Automobile Manufacturing Association (63) listed Oklahoma 
as 13th in the United States for total number of truck registrations. 
Table 15 lists the top 13 states in truck registrations. These statis­
tics have included all trucks, including pick-ups. There was a total of 
18,747,781 trucks registered in the United States in the year 1970.
Caldwell (4) reported that 1,747 for-hire motor carrier compa­
nies have been registered as Oklahoma based motor carriers by the Okla­
homa Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, The registered company could in­
clude a single truck or several hundred trucks in a fleet. The Oklahoma 
registered carriers have as a base of operation an Oklahoma location, 
such as Transcon Trucking, reportedly the world's largest trucking firm. 
Companies based in other states, such as Time 0 C, operate a number of 
carriers in Oklahoma but are not included in the Oklahoma registration
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TABLE 15







1 California 1,740,729 1,996,334 10.7 10.6
2 Texas 1,283,686 1,544,104 7,9 8.2
3 Pennsylvania 653,443 743,865 4.0 3.9
4 New York 623,924 687,721 3.9 3.7
5 Illinois 596,458 660,450 3.7 3.5
5 Ohio 559,018 650,256 3.5 3.5
7 Michigan 533,564 637,655 3.3 3.4
8 North Carolina 482,197 578,302 3.0 3.1
9 Florida 425,408 556,210 2.6 3.0
10 Georgia 410,899 510,886 2.5 2.7
11 Missouri 448,578 510,465 2.8 2.7
12 Indiana 495,685 505,274 3.1 2.7
13 Oklahoma 424,321 490,815 2.6 2.6
United States Total 15,178,849 18,747,781
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figures.
Sonnenberg (64) was quoted to say that the ICC has approxi­
mately 20,877 for-hire carriers registered in the United States, It 
cannot be determined from the Oklahoma Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety 
files how many of the 1,747 Oklahoma based carriers are also licensed 
by the ICC as interstate carriers. However, it has been assumed that 
nearly all carriers that come under BMCS regulations are also licensed 
by the ICC because it is very difficult to transport commodities that 
would not have some element constructed or produced in another state.
It is considered an interstate shipment under ICC regulations if any 
portion of the commodity has been produced in one state and transported 
into another.
The Office of Hazardous Materials reported 2,255 accidents in­
volving hazardous materials in 1971 from motor carriers (65), These 
accidents involved 233 carriers of a possible 10,000 handling hazardous 
materials (see Table 16), It has been estimated that only one out of 
twenty accidents are ever reported. This low reporting incidence may 
be a result of carriers inability to estimate damage other than physi­
cal damage to the truck.
Gasoline delivery trucks were involved in 311 accidents in 
1971, This would appear to be a very low figure compared to the total 
number of service stations and deliveries, Petroleum products repre­
sented the lowest distance shipped of any type of cargo by motor car­
rier (see Table 17),
The 1967 Ü, S, Truck Inventory (66) figures showed that for 
the West South Central region of the United States, trucks engaged in
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TABLE 16
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT 








Air Carriers 3 5
For Hire Highway Carriers 233 1,633
Private Highway Carriers 54 258
Rail Carriers 28 346












Meat and Dairy 611 468 166 402
Canned Food 532 335 135 405
Candy and Beverages 690 319 141 358
Textile and Leather 789 457 233 432
Apparel 695 543 238 527
Paper Products 680 277 137 488
Chemicals, Plastics, 
Synthetics & Rubber 548 283 142 447
Drugs and Paint 447 272 131 312
Petroleum and Coal 379 112 95 692
Rubber and Plastics 714 474 315 528
Lumber and Wood 
Products 1098 311 178 754
Furniture 903 528 299 569
Stone, Clay & Glass 205 136 107 196
Iron and Steel 367 204 208 314
Non Ferrous Metal 822 415 215 589
Fabricated Metal 556 402 161 366
Metal Cans 543 298 185 334
Industrial Machines 965 536 468 518
Machinery 497 497 313 577
Communication Products 912 547 242 627
Electrical Products 800 498 354 595
Motor Vehicles 539 232 139 409
Transportation
Equipment 465 391 443 435
Instruments, Photo & 
Watches 1123 523 179 593
Average Total Miles 550 270 152 490
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agriculture are the most numerous. The second most important group in 
the four-state region was the wholesale and retail trade trucks. This 
group, shown in Table 18, represented nearly 225,000 trucks surveyed, 
including over 40,000 truck-hauling chemicals and petroleum products.
Krasner (67) concluded in his study that 69 per cent of the 
hazardous material trucking accidents reported to DDT in 1966 involved 
flammable liquids. Tankers were involved in 72 per cent of the reported 
hazardous material trucking accidents. There was no indication that 
flammable liquids or that tankers as a vehicle type represented dispro­
portionate hazards. The high percentage of accidents was more likely 
due to the equally high percentage of tanker trucks. Table 19 is a re­
view of accidents reported to DOT from Duly, 1966, to December, 1968,
The Bureau of Motor Safety has compiled figures on motor car­
rier accidents with hazardous materials in local and intercity transpor­
tation in 1969 (58). Petroleum products represented 1.24 per cent of 
all accidents and 24.2 per cent of hazardous material accidents. Acci­
dent experience of major commodity groups is listed in Table 20.
The Oklahoma Department of Public Safety compiled annual sta­
tistics on traffic collisions. The 1970 annual report as revised in 
Table 21 indicates total number of vehicle accidents by vehicle type 
(69). A total of 123,213 vehicles were involved in accidents of which 
4.86 per cent were trucks not classified as pickups.
Motor carrier accidents involving hazardous materials can be 
classified into three types. First, the intermodal accident between the 
motor carrier and another vehicle. Secondly, are the single vehicle 
accidents involving a single motor carrier. A third type of motor
TABLE 18
1967 UNITED STATES TRUCK INVENTORY AND USE SURVEY TRUCKS: 
DISTRIBUTION OF PRINCIPLE PRODUCTS CARRIED IN THE 













Retail Trade For Hire
Farm Products 81,7 4.4 0.1 - 3.1 9.9 9.9
Processed Foods 0.5 - - - 8.0 20.5 1.2
Primary Metals - 0.2 3.8 6.3 15.0 2.1 1.6
Machinery 0.7 0.6 10.5 6,3 6,3 5,2 3.7
Transportation Equipment 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.8 3.3 5.4 1.9
Building Materials - 33.8 1.8 42.0 14.7 8.0 2.9
Furniture - - - - 3.9 11.5 10.8
Chemicals 0.1 - 0.6 2.0 3.4 4.5 1.4
Petroleum 0.1 - 5.4 1.6 0.9 10.8 6.9
Scrap and Garbage 0.3 0.2 - 0.6 2.4 1.0 0.9
Mixed Cargoes 5.5 0.3 3.4 9.7 9.2 10.3 44.5
No Products 4.7 3.3 41.0 20.7 17.4 2.4 2.5
Other 1.5 45.6 14.4 5.7 4.7 5.9 9.6




MOTOR CARRIER ACCIDENTS INVOLVING FIRE BY COMMODITY 
DULY, 1966 - DECEMBER, 1968
Accidents Deaths Injuries










Gasoline 65 58.56 32 65.67 42 43.75
Other Petroleum 24 21.62 7 14.58 12 12.50
Other Combustible 
Liquids 3 2.70 4 8.33 20 20.83
Flammable Liquids 5 4.50 0 0.00 10 10.42
Explosives 3 2.70 1 2.08 5 5.21
Non-Combustible 
Compressed Gas 2 1.80 1 2.08 1 1,04
Corrosive Liquids 5 4.50 2 4.17 2 2.08
Total 111 100.00 48 100.00 96 100.00
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TABLE 20
LOCAL AND INTERCITY MOTOR CARRIER ACCIDENTS 







Other Unclassified Combustibles 592 1,51
Flammable Solids 2 0.01
Gasoline 327 0,83
Other Petroleum Products 489 1.24
Combustible Compressed Gases 56 0.14
Other Combustible Liquids 166 0.42
Explosives 86 0.22
Oxydizing Agents 8 0.02
Dry Acid 1 0.00
Other Flammable Liquid 52 0.13
Non-Combustible Compressed Gases 63 0.16
Corrosive Liquid 171 0.44
Poison Gases 1 0.00
Radioactive Materials 1 0.00
Poisons (excluding gases) 8 0.02
Uranium 0 0.00
Sub Totals 2023 5.14






OKLAHOMA MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS - 1970
Type of Total Vehicles
Type of Vehicle Collision Involved
Passenger Cars Fatal 735
Injury 18,823
All Type Trucks Other Fatal 120
Than Pickups Injury 1,187
Pickup Trucks Fatal 160
Injury 2,433





carrier accident is that caused by the transfer of the product from 
storage to truck, truck to truck, or truck to storage.
Motor carriers with hazardous material have been involved in 
several credible accidents, Thayer (62) reported a truck-train accident 
at Everett, Massachusetts in March, 1967. A fuel tank trailer stalled 
on a railroad crossing. The driver of the truck attempted to flag down 
a 32-passeng8r self-propelled railroad car moving toward the intersec­
tion. The railroad car could not be stopped in time to avoid the colli­
sion, The tank trailer exploded killing 13 occupants of the car and in­
juring 19 others.
Sears (70) reviewed a single vehicle incident at Hopkinton, 
Massachusetts, September 15, 1970, A twin 1,000-gallon LPG tank de­
livery truck failed to slow down in a deceleration lane of a freeway and 
slammed into an overpass abuttment. The tank truck immediately burst 
into flame killing the driver who was attempting to escape* The tanks 
exploded shortly thereafter causing extensive damage to the overpass and 
to passing automobiles. The cause of the accident was not determined.
Finally, a third type of motor carrier accident involves pro­
duct transfer. Such an accident occurred August 6, 1970, at Moline, 
Illinois, as reported by the National Fire Protection Association (71).
A truck discharging 7,500 gallons of gasoline at a bulk plant ruptured 
the discharge hose spraying gasoline over a wide area, A spark from the 
truck engine ignited the vapors resulting in a fire. The fire was con­
tained to the truck, but 20 feet away were 11 storage tanks of gasoline 
each containing 15,000 gallons. The potential consequence of the stor­
age tanks exploding was never realized.
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A more frequent type of product transfer accident results from 
internal sparking during loading of intermediate vapor fuel such as 
3P-4 jet fuel. Bulkley and Ginsburg (72) reported in 1967 that over 60 
static ignition incidents occurred. The conditions leading to these 
loading incidents pointed out the direct relation of charge density in 
the oil to surface potential of producing internal sparking. (Charge 
density is expressed as the quantity of electrical charge, in micro- 
coulombs, per volume of oil in cubic meters or microcoulombs per cubic 
meter.) When 20 kilovolts of energy are produced approximately 1 inch 
away from various grounded electrodes, such as the fill pipe, a spark 
is created causing ignition.
The materials involved in these incidents represented only a 
small portion of the extra-hazardous cargo carried over the nation*s 
3 million miles of public roads. The National Board of Fire Under­
writers (73) estimated that in 1953, more than 300,000 tons of explo­
sives, 250,000 tons of blasting agents and 200,000 tons of poisonous 
substances moved over the highways. In addition, some 1200 shipments 
of radioactive materials and an undetermined amount of etiological 
agents are moving on the nation's streets and highways.
In 1969, the Bureau of Motor Carrier reported the total pro­
perty damage due to accidents of motor carriers was $85,045,860 (68). 
The property damage due to accidents involving hazardous materials 
amounted to $6,515,930 during the same period. Booz-Allen (74) sum­
marizes the distribution of property damage for motor carriers in Table 
22. The 17.1 per cent of hazardous material accidents result in more
than $5,000 property damage while only 8,8 per cent of all other
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TABLE 22
PROPERTY DAMAGE FOR UNITED STATES MOTOR CARRIERS - 1966
Range Hazardous Cargo Ail Others
(Dollars) Number Percentage Number Percentage
0 57 2.6 674 1.8
1 - 250 201 9.3 4,599 12.6
251 - 500 472 21.8 11,670 31.9
501 - 750 246 11.4 4,538 12.4
751 - 1000 211 9.8 3,093 8.5
1001 - 1250 109 5.1 1,703 4.7
1251 - 1500 73 3.6 1,322 3.6
1501 - 2000 109 5.1 1,723 4.7
2001 - 2500 76 3.5 1,193 3.3
2501 - 3000 59 2.7 905 2.5
3001 - 3500 46 2.2 666 1.8
3501 - 4000 52 2.4 505 1.4
4001 - 4500 45 2.1 368 1.0
4501 - 5000 28 1.3 370 1.0
ouer - 5000 370 17.1 3,204 8.8
Total 2,161 100.0 36,533 100.0
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accidents fall into this group.
Damage to the environment has not been easy to compute. Many 
transportation accidents have occurred doing extensive damage to the en­
vironment, but have not been recognized in the property damage figures. 
The Federal Water Quality Administration has compiled annual fish kills 
due to transportation causes (75), Table 23 summarizes the 1965 through 
1969 fish kills caused by transportation accidents involving hazardous 
materials. The dramatic increase in total numbers of fish killed may in 
part be due to the increased surveillance since 1965,
Planning Hazardous Material Incident Control 
The National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency 
Plan (?) has been developed in compliance with the Federal Water Pollu­
tion Control Act of 1970, The President delegated authority to the 
Council of Environmental Quality to provide for the preparation, publi­
cation, revision, and amendment of a National Contingency Plan for re­
moval of oil and hazardous substances. The Plan provided for a pattern 
of coordinated and integrated response by Federal agencies and depart­
ments to protect the environment from damaging effects of hazardous 
material spills.
The Plan provided for assignment of duties and responsibilities, 
establishment of emergency task forces, a system of notification and re­
porting, establishment of a National Coordination Center, a schedule of 
hazardous substance spill treatments, enforcement and investigative 
powers, public information, and on-scene coordination.
Like the Federal plan, Oklahoma has declared a policy and re­
sponsibility under the Plan to eliminate the discharge of oil or hazard-
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TABLE 23
TRANSPORTATION FISH KILL ACCIDENTS, 1965-1969
Year Type Total Reports Fish Killed


























DUS substances in sufficient quantities to degrade the quality of all 
water within their jurisdiction (76), The emphasis of each plan deals 
with pollution of waters without regard to the environment in general.
In Oklahoma, the State Response Team (SRT) acts as an emergency 
response team to be activated in event of a major oil or hazardous sub­
stance incident. The SRT membership includes as primary agencies; 
Oklahoma State Department of Agriculture, Oklahoma Corporation Commis­
sion, Oklahoma State Department of Health, State Department of Pollution 
Control, State Department of Wildlife Conservation, and the Oklahoma 
Water Resources Board, The names and telephone numbers of members of 
each department are listed in the plan to facilitate communication,
Kerr McGee Corporation has adopted an emergency response net­
work for agents dealing with their products. Hazardous materials pro­
duced by Kerr McGee have on the label a telephone number to be called 
24 hours a day in event of accident, Beckstedt (77) stated that Kerr 
McGee was the first company to instigate such a system.
The National Agricultural Chemical Association (78) developed 
in March, 1970, a National Safety Team Network to deal with incidents 
involving class B poisons and other pesticides. The system works simi­
lar to the Kerr McGee system except after calling a central number in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, a predetermined regional team is alerted. Upon re­
ceipt of an emergency message, the operator contacts the manufacturer 
or producer of the involved product regarding procedures for cleanup or 
containment. If assistance is necessary, one of 12 participating com­
panies will furnish equipment or technical assistance for the prompt and 
efficient cleanup and decontamination. The 12 companies representing 40
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safety teams are: Chevron, Shell, Stauffer, Monsanto, Dow, Hercules,
Chemagro, Diamond Shamrock, V/elslcol, Niagra, Union Carbide, and Kerr 
McGee.
The Manufacturing Chemists Association (79) has developed the 
Chemical Transportation Emergency Center to give assistance involving 
any chemical spill in transportation. This system provides a toll free 
number to call in Washington, D.C, for emergency assistance. This 
emergency system does not have safety teams but will assist the local 
authorities with information regarding the characteristic of spilled 
chemicals and how best to handle the situation. They also publish the 
Chem-Card manual carried by police, fire, and emergency response people 
for quick identification of the hazards of selected chemicals. Truck­
ers also carry the manual when handling dangerous materials,
Hutchinson (80) has proposed six objectives of a transporta­
tion system:
a) Minimize travel time between land use areas.
b) Maximize transportation safety,
c) Minimize operating costs of transportation systems,
d) Maximize the development of the planned land use configura­
tion and intensity of development,
e) To minimize capital cost,
f) To balance the capacity of the system with the capacity of 
the environmental land use areas to accept transportation.
Transportation planners would generally agree to these goals 
and at the same time overlook the nature and characteristics of vehi­
cles within the transportation systems. The planning process should 
have included built-in precautions to prevent hazardous material
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incidents,
Leimkuhler (81) asks the question, "How much precaution is 
needed and what special safeguards can be justified for shipments of 
hazardous materials?" A wide variety of special precautions have been 
suggested to maintain the integrity of cargoes, including; escorts, 
buffer vehicles, convoys, special tie-down systems, enroute inspection, 
local police coordination, and restriction to certain traffic systems,
Beals (82) suggested that external climatic conditions must be 
examined from existing meterological data to determine transportation 
needs. He considered as a transportation environment, those conditions 
of heat or energy that serve as "initiating stimuli" in causing fire or 
explosions. He further suggested that when the hazardous substance in­
volved in an incident results in a vapor cloud, either poisonous or ex­
plosive, the atmospheric conditions determine the extent of the danger. 
The contributing factor is the ability of the atmosphere to disperse 
such a cloud, this ability being dependent on local topography, wind 
speed, time of day, and season. Those climatic conditions of particu­
lar emphasis to hazardous material transportation are temperature, radi­
ant energy day and night, extremes of humidity, atmospheric pressure, 
end atmospheric turbulence.
Edgerton (83) recommended 14 steps for reducing probability of 
accidents with hazardous materials;
a) Transportability of shipping containers,
b) Reliability of containers and vehicles,
c) Administrative controls, checklists, and standards of opera­
tion.
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d) Improved container design and manufacturing.
e) Performance standards,
f) Labeling and placarding,
g) Driver and carriers briefings,
h) Inspection of vehicles,
i) Careful selection of shipping routes and schedules, 
j) Centralized accident reporting and analysis,
k) Check and control points during transport,
l) Time control of shipment passing through congested areas, 
m) Escorts for shipments, 
n) Speed control of vehicle.
He further suggested for reduction of hazardous material acci­
dents, that adequate damage reporting systems, special investigation of 
accidents, instrumentation to measure characteristics of load and moni­
toring to observe movement and cargo stress and vibration data must be 
accomplished.
The National Transportation Safety Board (84) discussed the 
different requirements of packaging for different modes of transporta­
tion. An analysis was made from selected data as seen in Table 24:
"The mode with the lo'west safety value setting permits the high­
est filling density, while the smallest ’package’ with the high­
est minimum working pressure has the lowest filling density 
limit. Retest requirements for the smallest ’package’ are the 
most stringent, while there are no retest requirements for the 
mode which carries massive continuous flows of the commodity,"
Retesting of tank barges is not routinely required while the mode with
continuous flows and the potential for the largest spills has the lowest
test-to-working pressure ratio. Still another example of difference in
regulatory requirements occurs in control of low temperature brittleness
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Cylinders Highway Rail Pipeline Marine
Working
Pressure










Years 10,00 5.0 10.0 none
dis­
cretionary
















of vehicle tank materials. Railroad tank cars for anhydrous ammonia are 
not required to have steel which remains tough at low pressures, but 
cargo tanks for motor carriers must be made of steel which passes tough­
ness tests at -30° Fahrenheit.
Morgan et al. (85) prepared tables regarding the cost of a 
hazardous material motor carrier incident. Using radiological material 
as an example, they devised six categories of accident situations:
Category I - Shipment delayed in route, local police furnish 
surveillance. $200-500
Category II - Load surface radiation raised. AEC furnishes a 
2-man survey team. Surveillance and special 
parking required. $2,000-5,000
Category III - Limited release confined to truck. Surface 
decontaminated. Surveillance and special 
parking required. $5,000-10,000
Category 1\I - Release to ground. Area cleared causing
temporary work stoppage. Detours required.
Driver hospitalized, $20,000-50,000
Category U - Truck-trailer overturns and burns. Release to 
environment. Evacuation of four square blocks.
Driver hospitalized, $50,000-100,000
Category VI - Liquid release to water via ground. Community 
water supply damaged for three days. Extensive 
detours, $1,000,000-2,000,000
These figures are subject to many variables, particularly if the inci­
dent occurred on a county road in rural Oklahoma in contrast to a metro­
politan downtown street. Only major types of hazardous material inci­
dents are reported to DOT; therefore, the small spills and incidents 
occurring without serious injury or damage are not recorded. The costs 
of restoring the environment to its original state are difficult to com­
pute, and in many cases, when considered, would run higher than the 
actual physical property damage.
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Rath at al. (86) referred to economic constraints affecting 
the willingness of carriers to report each incident. Carriers fear 
that increased regulations will result, making hazardous material ship­
ments more expensive to handle. Public pressure could force the im­
provement of packaging regulations, heavier walls on tankers, imposi­
tions on maximum quantities and a greater emphasis on separation of com­
modities. Public pressure could also force expensive and time consuming 
routing for bulk shipments avoiding inhabited areas.
CHAPTER II 
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Evidence had indicated that controls of hazardous material 
transportation by motor carrier in Oklahoma has been inadequate. It has 
been demonstrated that the character and degree of hazardous materials 
on Oklahoma highways is not known. It was the purpose of this study to 
analyze the characteristics of hazardous material movement on the major 
highway systems of Oklahoma to determine relative numbers, varieties, 
and movements within the state. It was also the purpose of this study 
to provide recommendations for hazardous materials transportation in 
Oklahoma based on available data. From these recommendations it was 
felt that state and local hazardous materials control programs could be 
formulated.
The truck weight studies conducted by the Oklahoma State High­
way Department in 1970, 1971, and 1972 were reviewed to determine 
hazardous material movement through selected highway scale houses. 
Specifically, data were recorded for the hour of day passing the scale 
house, direction of travel, state of registration, station location, 
body style of hazardous material truck, and the specific commodity 
aboard. The data for each scale house was tabulated and compared for 
each of the 3-year periods,
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It was felt that the investigative technique as well as the in­
formation obtained from this study could be used by local and state 
governmental agencies to determine the need for hazardous material 
safety programs. Communities within Oklahoma might also benefit from 
this information to better understand the nature and complexity of their 
individual hazardous material problems. It was also intended by this 
study to acquire the basic knowledge and data regarding movement of 
hazardous material in Oklahoma for promotion of additional study and 
research, particularly in the areas of truck safety and cargo security.
CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
The data for this study was assimilated from the Oklahoma 
Department of Highways annual truck weight study. The truck weight 
studies are done by a five- to seven-man crew each summer at selected 
scale houses throughout the state, A variety of information is collec­
ted on each truck passing through the stations during the survey period. 
The information once recorded on survey sheets was coded and placed onto 
computer tape.
The coded data for 1970, 1971, and 1972 were available for re­
view, The data from the highway department computer tapes were trans­
ferred to a University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center computer tape 
and made compatible with the Q.U, computer. The program was then run on 
the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center IBM 360 Computer, 
Computer services were utilized between a period from September 1, 1972, 
and February 2, 1973,
A Fortran program was written to retrieve pertinent data from 
the highway department tapes. The following information was recorded 
from the available data for each year:




b) The total number of trucks surveyed per station,
c) Hour of the day truck passes through station by commodity 
aboard,
d) Direction of travel for each truck.
e) Hour of the day hazardous material trucks pass through 
each station,
f) Body style of truck for each hazardous material shipment,
g) Direction of travel for each hazardous material,
h) Number of hazardous material trucks for each station.
It was not possible from the coded data to determine in each 
case the specific commodity aboard every truck5 therefore, it was neces­
sary to manually examine each survey sheet collected for the 3-year 
periods. Approximately 23,000 reports were reviewed for specific hazard­
ous material aboard and the state of registration for the truck*
The scale houses used as survey points ware the same each year
of the study. The length of time the survey was conducted in each scale
house was also the same for each year. Each station was not, however, 
surveyed the same number of hours. Ten stations wsrs operated for 16 
hours, 6 a,m, to 10 p,m*, but never more than 8 hours in any one day. 
Pour stations were operated for 24 hours, but never more than 8 hours 
for any one day. Surveys were conducted on weekdays only, Saturday and 
Sunday being excluded.
Fourteen scale houses were used in the study. The location and 
length of time for survey for each station are as follows;
1) Sayre - 2 miles west of Sayre on 1-40 (24 hours)
2) Boise City - north edge of town on U,S, 385 (16 hours)
3) Woodward - 1 mile N,E. on U,S, 270 (16 hours)
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4) Dauis - for 1970 and 1971 the scale house was located 2 
miles north of Dauis on U.S. 77, 1-35 was completed for
1972 study and the scale house was relocated 5 miles south 











McAlester - 1 mile south of McAlester on U.S. 69 (16 hours)
Durant - 2 miles north of Durant on U.S. 69 (24 hours)
Warner - east of Warner on U.S. 64 (16 hours)
Tulsa - at north and of Turner Turnpike at U.S. 75 junc­
tion (24 hours)
Uinita - 4 miles west of l/inita on U.S. 66 (16 hours)
Blackwell - 5 miles north of U.S. 60 exit on 1-35 (24 hours)
Ada - Main St. junction State Highways 99 and 3 (16 hours)
Hugo - 3 miles south of Hugo on U.S. 271 (16 hours)
Drumright - junction of State Highway 33 and State Highway 
16 (15 hours)
Altus - 2.5 miles east on U.S. 62 (16 hours)
Identification of a hazardous material was made from the ma­
terials listed in the Department of Transportation Code of Federal Regu­
lations, Title 49, Section 172,5. In addition, any commodity that would 
probably cause dramatic environmental damage but was not listed on the 
federal list was also included.
Traffic volume characteristics were obtained from the highway 
department annual traffic studies. These studies are conducted on a 
continuing basis throughout the year. Average daily traffic and truck 
traffic flows were available for 1970, 1971, and 1972, Each scale house 
was represented in these studies.
Commodities aboard all trucks passing through the scale house 
ware tabulated for each of the three years. Comparisons were made for
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total number of trucks by commodity and determinations were made regard­
ing the percentage of each commodity for the total number of trucks.
The total number of trucks passing each station during the sur­
vey was tabulated by year. Comparisons were made to determine changes 
in traffic flow at each station over the three-year period.
A listing of each hazardous material load was recorded as to 
state of registration for the truck. Comparisons were made regarding 
the frequency of states and total number of states represented. The 
state of registration for hazardous materials was listed for each scale 
house. These data were reviewed to determine the influence of the ad­
joining states on a particular station.
A comprehensive listing of hazardous materials passing through 
each scale house by year was compiled. Changes in frequency of particu­
lar hazardous materials were noted. Changes in the total species of 
hazardous materials per year were also determined.
The hazardous material flow characteristics for each scale 
house were reviewed. The total volume of hazardous materials was tabu­
lated for each station by year. The direction of hazardous material flow 
was also determined and listed for each year.
Each scale house was examined for specific hazardous materials 
passing during the survey. The frequency of each material by year was 
recorded.
Net positive flow of hazardous materials for each station was 
calculated. General characteristics of the movement of hazardous 




The proportion of hazardous material shipments by motor carrier 
in Oklahoma was 8.94 per cent in 1970, 9.11 per cent in 1971, and 10.01 
per cent of total motor carrier shipments in 1972. Direct comparison 
with data from other states and the United States have not been avail­
able, but estimates have been computed. Sonnenberg (24) has estimated 
that, nationally, 4 per cent of all motor carrier shipments are hazard­
ous materials. Extracting from the 1967 Truck Inventory and Use study 
by the Department of Commerce, trucks used for shipping petroleum and 
chemicals equaled 4.96 per cent (66). From the same study, the west- 
south-central district, which included Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and 
Oklahoma, equaled 4,37 per cent. These data indicate that Oklahoma has 
experienced up to 2,5 times the hazardous material shipments predicted 
for adjoining states or the Nation (see Table 25 and 26),
The most frequent hazardous materials noted were gasoline, 
lube oils, tar-asphalt, bombs, jet fuel, and ammonium nitrate. Gaso­
line lead all categories in 1970 and 1972 with 21.13 per cent and 24.59 
per cent. Lube oils headed hazardous material categories in 1971 with 




UNITED STATES CHEMICAL AND PETROLEUM SHIPMENTS 




Agricultural 3,710,000 22,260 11,130
Forestry 156,000 0 936
Mining 104,000 1,664 3,120
Construction 1,144,000 21,660 17,328
Wholesale-Retail 1,807,000 81,141 198,135
For Hire 677,000 14,895 20,987









OKLAHOMA, LOUISIANA, TEXAS, AND ARKANSAS CHEMICAL 
AND PETROLEUM SHIPMENTS BY MOTOR CARRIER,
1967 TRUCK INVENTORY AND USE STUDY
Total
Surveyed Chemicals Petroleum
Agricultural 600,000 600 600
Forest 24,000 0 0
Mining 27,000 162 1,458
Construction 169,000 3,380 2,704
Manufacturing 36,000 1,224 324
Wholesale-Retail 224,000 10,080 24,192
For Hire 66,000 924 4,554
Total 1,146,000 16,370 33,832
Total Percentage 100 1.42 2.95
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TABLE 27









Gasoline 75 21.13 72 17.82 105 24.59
Tar-Asphalt 41 11.55 47 11.63 25 5.85
Bombs 34 9.57 22 5.44 18 4.23
Bet Fuel 25 7.04 9 2.23 13 3.04
Lube Oil 23 6.48 83 20.54 53 12.41
Ammonium Nitrate 16 4.51 16 3.96 37 8.68
Ammunition 30 mm + 12 3.38 3 0.74 3 0.70
Miscellaneous In­
organic and
Organic Chemicals 11 3.10 21 5.19 32 7.49
Propane 9 2.54 11 2.72 26 6.10
Paint 9 2.54 8 1.98 3 0.70
Detergents a 2.25 7 1.73 3 0.70
Diesel 6 1.69 11 2.72 16 3.76
Salt 6 1.69 6 1.48 9 2.12
Surry Oil 6 1.69 - - - -
Butane 5 1.41 4 0,99 3 0.70
Glues and Adhesives 4 1.13 13 3.21 4 0.94
Lime 4 1.13 9 2.22 10 2.35
Liquid Oxygen 3 0.85 4 0.99 4 0.94
Cleaning Fluids 3 0.85 - - 1 0,23
Crude Oil 3 0.85 5 1.23 . - -
Insecticides 3 0.85 1 0.25 1 0.23
Sulphuric Acid 3 0.85 1 0.25 6 1.42
Benzene 3 0.85 2 0.50 1 0.23
Sodium Alkali 3 0.85 5 1.23 - -
Chemical and Petro­










Synthetic Resin 3 0.85 1 0.25 - —
Oil Field Chemicals 2 0.56 1 0.25 - -
Liquid Carbon Dioxide 2 0.56 5 1.23 1 0.23
Fireworks 2 0.56 - - - -
Chlorox 2 0.56 - - - -
Miscellaneous
Petroleum Products 2 0.56 _
Gas-Oil 2 0.56 - - - -
Oxygen 2 0.56 1 0.25 1 0.23
Aviation Gas 2 0.56 1 0.25 - -
Hydrogen 2 0.56 1 0.25 1 0.23
Alcohol 2 0.56 2 0.50 1 0.23
Urea 1 0.28 1 0.25 - -
Explosives 1 0.28 - - 2 0.47
Argon 1 0.28 - - - -
Toluene 1 0.28 2 0.50 - -
Kerosine 1 0.28 1 0.25 - -
Distillate Fuel 1 0.28 - - - -
Ammonium 1 0.28 1 0.25 9 2.11
Rockets 1 0.28 - - - -
Rocket Fuel 1 0.28 ' - - - -
Liquid Nitrogen 1 0.28 - - 5 1.17
Coal Tar 1 0.28 1 0.25 - -
Rodenticide 1 0.28 - - - -
Ethylene 1 0.28 - - - -
Blasting Caps 1 0.28 - - - -
Acetylene - - 1 0.25 8 1.87
Nitroglycerine - - 1 0.25 - -
Synthetic Detergent - - 1 0.25 - -










Radioactive Materials — — 2 0.50 2 0.47
Solvent - - 1 0.25 2 0.47
Paint Solvent - - 1 0.25 - -
Helium - - 1 0.25 - -
Chlorine - - 2 0.50 3 0.70
D P 4 Gasoline - - 8 1.98 - -
Nitric Acid - - 1 0.25 - -
Vinegar - - 2 0.50 1 0.23
Ammonium Hydroxide - - 1 0.25 - -
Antifreeze - - 1 0.25 - -
Hexane - - 1 0.25 - -
Hydrocyanic - - - - 1 0.23
Carbonic Acid - - - - 1 0.23
Hydrochloric Acid - - - - 1 0.23
Nitric Oxide - - - - 1 0.23
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No particular flow pattern was noted for gasoline. Gasoline 
cargoes were detected at all survey stations, and in only one case, 
Drumright, was gasoline noted moving predominantly in one direction for 
each of the 3-year periods.
Bombs and ammunition were detected almost exclusively at the 
Sayre station and were moving predominantly westward. A total of 74 
bomb shipments were noted for the three years in Oklahoma, 65 listed at 
Sayre with 53 of them moving west. Of all bomb and ammunition ship­
ments, 85.13 passed the Sayre station. It was determined that the 
majority of the bomb and ammunition trucks originated at the McAlester 
arsenal with a small proportion coming from the Red River Arsenal in 
Texas. These data support that on a given day, 18 to 34 bomb, ammuni­
tion, or other classified military explosive trucks crossed through 
metropolitan Oklahoma City and west into Texas,
For the 3-year period, hazardous materials increased 16,87 per 
cent overall at the survey stations. The totals were 355, 404, and 427, 
respectively, for 1970-72, Fallwell (29) reported chemical production 
up 4.2 per cent in 1970, up 1 per cent in 1971, and down 1 per cent in 
1972. These data would suggest that annual production of hazardous ma­
terials does not immediately affect the frequency of movement in Oklahoma, 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the total number of hazardous ma­
terial trucks per station and.direction of flow. The survey stations 
located on State and U.S. highways showed relative stability for fre­
quency over the 3-year period. This can partially be explained by the 
fact that these highways are feeder roads to local communities, and 
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FigurB 3.'— Volume and Direction of Hazardous Materials, Oklahoma Stations
(Eastbound and Westbound)
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Examination of the three interstate highway stations indicated 
annual increases of hazardous materials. These stations are listed as 
Blackwell, Davis, and Sayre, and represented increases of 16,32, 22,85, 
and 51.38 per cent, respectively. The significant increase at Davis was 
due in part to the opening of 1-35 Interstate between Oklahoma City and 
the Texas border in the Fall of 1970, These data indicate that a large 
portion of northbound hazardous materials which moved through Durant in 
1970 and 1971 shifted to the new interstate in 1972,
Figure 4 illustrates the net positive flow for each station for 
each year. The net positive flow has been determined as the direction
at each station that the greatest number of hazardous materials trucks
were moving. This comparison reveals that there was a funneling of 
hazardous materials from Tulsa, Blackwell, and Davis toward Oklahoma 
City and westward toward Sayre, These data further support that the 
movement of hazardous materials was concentrated toward the densely popu­
lated areas of Oklahoma,
It was also observed (Table 28) that Oklahoma registered trucks
outnumbered the trucks registered in all other states for each year;
however, the total percentage of Oklahoma trucks to out-of-state trucks 
decreased, indicating that out-of-state trucks played a bigger role in 
transporting hazardous materials through Oklahoma, These data support 
the belief that Oklahoma has been the intersection for national trans­
portation.
All survey stations had a majority of Oklahoma registered 
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STATE OF REGISTRATION FOR HAZARDOUS 
MATERIAL SHIPMENTS
Per­ Per­ Per­
1970 centage 1971 centage 1972 centage
Oklahoma 281 79.16 301 74.75 300 70.25
Texas 37 10.44 45 11.13 62 14.52
Missouri 12 3.39 20 4.95 8 1.87
Kansas 12 3.38 8 1.98 33 7.73
Nebraska 2 0.56 4 0.99 5 1.20
New Mexico 2 0.56 - - - -
Arkansas 1 0.28 5 1.24 3 0.70
Tennessee 1 0.28 - - 1 0.23
California 1 0.28 - - 3 0.70
Wisconsin 1 0.28 - - — -
Delaware 1 0.28 3 0.73 - -
Colorado 1 0.28 4 0.99 3 0.70
Iowa 1 0.28 5 1.24 - -
Florida 1 0.28 1 0.25 - -
Indiana 1 0.28 - - - -
Mississippi - - 2 0.50 2 0.47
Ohio - - 2 0.50 1 0.23
Illinois - - 1 0.25 2 0.47
Michigan - - 1 0.25 - -
Minnesota - - 1 0.25 - -
Alabama - - - - 2 0.47
New Jersey - - - - 1 0.23
Louisiana - - - - 1 0.23
Total 355 100.00 404 100.00 427 100.00
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than on interstate highways reported predominantly Oklahoma trucks with 
a small influence from the nearest border states. For example, at Boise 
City, the majority of hazardous materials were on Oklahoma trucks with a 
few trucks from Colorado and Texas, and at Hugo, the majority was from 
Oklahoma with several trucks from Texas, At the three stations on 
interstate highways, the out-of-state influence increased beyond just 
the nearest border state and included a broad spectrum of states,
A certain sequence of events has occurred which was felt to be 
a problem regarding the transportation of hazardous materials in Okla­
homa, As the interstate highway system has been improved, hazardous 
material shipments as well as other commodities have been shifted to the 
new improved highways. It also appeared that improved interstate systems 
attracted the out-of-state transporter of hazardous material, possibly 
using Oklahoma as a short cut to points east and west, north or south.
Tank trucks transported 49 to 58 per cent of all hazardous 
materials, while closed van-type trucks handled 22 to 26 per cent, A 
total of 23 different body types were noted including flatbed, open top 
van, hopper, stock, grain, and pick-up trucks (see Table 29), The in­
tegrity of a hazardous material shipment involved in an accident has 
been considered a serious problem, particularly with vehicles of open- 
type body styles.
Miscellaneous freight shipments represented 18,18 per cent of 
all commodities surveyed. The miscellaneous category included shipments 
with two or more commodities. It was felt that a certain proportion of 
these shipments contained hazardous materials further increasing the
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TABLE 29
BODY STYLES FOR HAZARDOUS 
MATERIAL SHIPMENTS
Body Types 1970 1971 1972
Pickup 1 1 15
Flatbed 12 22 24
Low Boy 2 1 -
Rack 4 - 2
Canopy 3 - -
Open Top Box or l/an 21 11 17
Dump 4 28 3
Hopper 2 5 11
Van 92 90 110
Insulated 4 9 12
Moving 1 - 1
Tank 53 37 51
Petroleum Tank 153 191 161
Bottler 2 1 5
Utility 1 - 1
Panel - 2 -
Stock - 1 4
Grain - 5 2
Pipe - - 1
Express - - 1
Bituminous - 4
Mixer - - 4
Container - - 1
Total 355 404 427
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total percentage of hazardous material shipments. These data and the 
literature suggest that mixed cargoes represent problems of compata- 
bility and cross contamination.
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The research was designed to determine the extent of hazardous 
materials transported by motor carrier in Oklahoma. A total of 19,418 
motor carriers were surveyed from 1970 to 1972 at 14 Oklahoma highway 
scale houses. The data collected for each motor carrier were commodities 
aboard, directions of movement. State of motor carrier registration, body 
styles of unit, and time of day passing the scale house, A review of 
State and local hazardous material controls was also conducted, including 
accident response and cleanup proceedings.
Based on the observations and results of this study, the fol­
lowing were concluded;
1, The total number of hazardous material shipments by motor 
carrier in Oklahoma has. increased over the 3-year period, A total of 
1,186 trucks contained hazardous materials for an overall proportion of 
9,38 per cent. The data support that motor carrier transportation of 
hazardous materials in Oklahoma may be several times above the national 
average.
It is recommended that the State of Oklahoma, including its 
constituent communities, enact legislation controlling the movement of 
hazardous materials. Adequate regulation does not exist presently in
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Oklahoma to deal with Intrastate movement of hazardous materials. Con­
sideration should also be given to special city and state routing where 
necessary, standards for special placarding, and controls on movement 
of hazardous materials in metropolitan areas during peak traffic con­
gestion, Legislation should also include control of hazardous material 
shipments during periods of inclement weather such as ice, snow, fog, 
smoke, and severe storms,
2, The net positive flow of hazardous material on interstate 
highways moved predominantly toward Oklahoma City and westward to Sayre, 
This concentration of hazardous material toward densely populated areas 
increases the potential for accidents resulting in loss of life, proper­
ty damage and environmental degradation. The literature supports the 
belief that Oklahoma communities have not been adequately prepared or 
knowledgable to handle incidents involving these materials.
It is recommended that the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety 
revise their accident reporting system to include the nature of the com­
modity aboard motor carriers involved in accidents. The record should 
include not only the specific name of the commodity but also information 
regarding commodity loss and general integrity of the load. The report­
ing system should also include information regarding final deposition 
of the lost commodity and particular facts regarding clean up.
The data available from this record system would provide valu­
able information regarding hazardous material accidents and aid respon­
sible agencies toward better control of hazardous materials,
3, Oklahoma registered trucks shipping hazardous materials 
were reported over 70 per cent of the time for the 3-year period, A 10
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per cent decrease in Oklahoma trucks was noted for the 3-year period 
indicating a greater influence from out-of-state motor carriers. This 
out-of-state influence can be expected to increase the total number of 
hazardous material shipments through the densely populated areas of 
Oklahoma because of the transient nature of out-of-state trucks and their 
extensive use of interstate highways which intersect near metropolitan 
areas.
It is recommended that a port-of-entry system be established in 
Oklahoma to provide a constant monitoring of interstate shipments of 
hazardous materials. The system would require 24-hour operation of scale 
houses on major highways near state borders. This system would provide 
the mechanism for the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety to enact a 
hazardous material safety program and at the same time increase tax reve­
nue and provide needed weight controls for motor carriers. Such a pro­
gram would accumulate valuable information regarding various kinds and 
amounts of hazardous materials. The safety program should also include 
motor carrier inspection and provide special routing requirements for 
particular commodities and restrictions to movement during severe cli­
matic conditions,
4. Gasoline and petroleum products were the most frequently 
detected hazardous materials transported by motor carrier in Oklahoma. 
These materials were detected at all stations and can be expected to move 
on every highway and every major street in the State of Oklahoma. Poten­
tial danger exists from the total numbers and ubiquitous nature of these 
vehicles,
5, These data indicate that 85.13 per cent of all ordinance and
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ammunition transported through Oklahoma moved west through Oklahoma City 
on 1-40. This has suggested a disproportionate hazard to metropolitan 
Oklahoma City from accidents involving explosives. In addition to the 
inherent danger of these materials, the question of national security 
has been raised. The bombs, ammunition, and other hazardous materials 
have been manufactured with a relatively good degree of security, but 
once loaded onto a truck all security vanishes until reaching a final 
destination. The American society has been vulnerable to the radical 
and revolutionist bent on disruption and destruction.
It is recommended that the Federal Government investigate 
methods for securing the safe delivery of extra hazardous materials and 
study the possibility of sabotage and hijacking of certain hazardous 
materials.
5. Tank trucks transport over 50 per cent of all hazardous 
materials in Oklahoma. The second most frequent group was closed vans 
representing 25 per cent. The remaining 25 per cent were open type 
vehicles such as dump trucks, flatbeds, and open vans.
These data suggest that a considerable amount of hazardous 
material has been transported in open-type vehicles. The integrity of 
such loads are in doubt when involved in accidents.
It is recommended that additional research be conducted regard­
ing the stability of hazardous materials transported in open-type vehi­
cles, particularly its ability to remain intact through accident condi­
tions.
Due to the large number of closed vans transporting hazardous 
materials and the equally high number of trucks classified miscellaneous
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freight, it is felt that the compatability of mixed cargoes needs in­
vestigation and study. The literature indicate that hazardous materials 
have been shipped with foodstuffs and, in other cases, spillage within 
the cargo container has not been sufficiently removed before food pro­
ducts are loaded.
Additional study is also needed on the micro environment within 
the closed van including temperature, pressure, humidity, and vibration, 
and the effects of these on the stability of various types of hazardous 
materials,
7. It is recommended that the Department of Public Safety 
require special drivers training for hazardous material transportation 
and provide special licensing requirements,
B. Additional study is suggested to determine the extent of 
spilled and damaged hazardous materials and determine methods for clean­
ing and disposal of waste material from the accident site,
9, The literature indicate that intercity movement of hazard­
ous materials has been difficult to determine. It is recommended that a 
study be conducted to determine a method for evaluating hazardous mater­
ial movement within large communities,
10, It is recommended that the Oklahoma Water Resources Board 
conduct an inventory of the various hazardous materials moving across 
major water sheds of Oklahoma, Irreversible damage to the environment 
and to public drinking water supplies could be averted from such a 
study,
11, Accident investigation research is needed for hazardous 
material incident control and prevention. Sufficient numbers of
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hazardous material accidents have occurred in Oklahoma to justify the 
study,
12. It is recommended that research and study be conducted 
regarding other modes of hazardous material transportation in Oklahoma;,
13. It is recommended that the Oklahoma State Health Depart­
ment prepare a comprehensive plan to deal with hazardous material inci­
dents and include coordination of emergency response personnel, training 
for accident site control and establishment of a statewide system of 
disposal sites for hazardous material wastes.
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TOTAL TRUCKS SURVEYED PER STATION
Station 1970 1971 1972
Boise City 253 319 297
Woodward 196 253 203
Altus 227 225 283
Ada 195 361 506
Hugo 268 319 374
Durant 571 674 493
Uinita 427 501 523
Tulsa 673 557 509
Blackwell 698 954 1,160
Sayre 655 674 756
McAlester 392 473 418
Davis 683 844 869
Drumright 189 230 234
Warner 333 343 306
Total 5,760 6,727 6,931
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TABLE 31 









Empty 1,,791 31.11 2,295 34.11 2,697 38.91
Farm Products 576 10,00 640 9.51 617 8.90
Non Metalic Minerals 69 1.20 146 2.17 145 2.09
Ordinance & Accessories 49 0.85 25 0.37 23 0.33
Food & Kindred Products 681 11.82 668 9.93 578 8.34
Basic Textiles 29 0.50 32 0.48 22 0.32
Apparel 21 0.37 20 0.30 16 0.23
Timber 4 Wood Products 76 1.32 88 1.31 110 1.59
Furniture & Fixtures 336 5.83 343 5.10 263 3.79
Pulp, Paper & Allied 
Products 36 0.63 64 0.95 61 0.88
Chemicals & Allied 
Products 99 1.72 110 1.64 151 2.17
Rubber i Misc. Plastic 
Products 56 0.97 48 0.71 49 0.71
Stone, Clay, & Glass 
Products 96 1.67 124 1.85 106 1.52
Primary Metal Products 116 2,01 224 3.33 203 2.93
Fabricated Metal Pro­
ducts 107 1.86 95 1,41 175 2.52
Machinery, Except 
Electrical 196 3,40 234 3.48 196 2.83
Electrical Machinery 53 0.92 56 0.83 109 1.57
Transportation Equip­
ment 131 2.28 186 2.77 162 2.34
Instruments, Photo, 
Optics 8 0.14 9 0.13 8 0.12
Misc. Products of 
Manufacturing 27 0.47 19 0.28 143 2.06
Waste & Scrap Metal 15 0.26 35 0.52 29 0.42
Misc. Freight Ship­












tainers 58 1.01 64 0.95 27 0.40
Small Packaged Freight 68 1.18 45 0.67 0 0,00
Petroleum & Coal 
Products 237 4.11 264 3.92 217 3,13
All Others 29 0.50 24 0.36 54 0.78
Total 5,760 100.00 6,727 100.00 6,931 100.00
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TABLE 32








Boise City 1970 2,252 22.54 510
1971 2,045 24.86 508
1972 2,187 26.74 584
Woodward 1970 1,717 19.62 337
1971 1,744 19.43 339
1972 1,851 25.44 470
Altus 1970 2,255 12.01 271
1971 2,121 11.55 245
1972 1,827 18.44 336
Ada 1970 1,032 8.33 86
1971 997 8.92 89
1972 1,007 10.32 104
Hugo 1970 3,090 18.89 584
1971 2,423 11.84 287
1972 2,533 11.44 290
Durant 1970 5,923 24.71 1,464
1971 5,390 26,32 1,419
1972 5,247 24.94 1,306
Vinita 1970 1,585 14.60 131
1971 1,674 12.99 217
1972 1,743 13.14 228
Tulsa 1970 40,056
1971 41,124 7.10 2,920
1972 46,549 7.85 3,654
Blackwell 1970 4,834 25.11 1,214
1971 5,302 23.17 1,228
1972 5,820 26.13 1,519
Sayre 1970 6,940 14.79 1,026
1971 7,358 18.30 1,347










McAlester 1970 5,340 23.20 1,239
1971 5,174 23.15 1,198
1972 5,181 24.91 1,290
Davis 1970 7,649 26.17 2,002
1971 8,362 20.41 1,707
1971 14,038 17.17 2,400
Drumright 1970 2,445 13.98 342
1971 2,602 10.79 281
1972 2,772 11.36 313
Warner 1970 4,758 22.65 1,078
1971 4,958 20.77 1,030







Material 1970 1971 1972
Crude Oil 1 1 -
Misc. Inorganic & Organic 3 3 5
Hydrogen 2 - -
Sulfuric Acid 2 1 -
Paint 3 1 1
Insecticide 1 - 1
Salt 2 3 5
Gasoline 8 2 9
Jet Fuel 1 5 -
Aviation Gas 2 - -
Lube Oils 7 11 11
Tar-Asphalt 3 1 1
Diesel 2 3 1
Benzene 2 - -
Distillate Fuel 1 - -
Propane 1 - 2
Radioactive - 1 -






Alcohol - 1 -
Detergents - 1 -
Sodium Alkali
Chemical & Petroleum Waste 1 :
Butane - 1 -
Ammonium Nitrate - 1 4
Bombs - 1 -
Ammonia - — 2
Caustic Soda - - 2
Naphtha - - 1
Solvent - - 2
Total 41 44 51
100
TABLE 34
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR
SAYRE STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Crude Oil 1 - —
Bombs 28 14 16
Ammunition 30 mm + 7 - -
Liquid CO2 2 - 1
Cleaning Fluid 1 - 1
Fireworks 2 - -
Blasting Caps 1 - -
Gasoline 2 5 14
Lube Oils 5 - -
Surry Oil 6 - -
Propane - 1 4
Benzene - 1 -
Salt - 1 -
Glue-Adhssiues - 3 1
Detergent - 1 -
Oxygen - 1 -
Sodium Alkali 1 -
Hydrocyanic Acid - - 1
Uranium - - 1
Caustic Potash - 1
Paint - - 1
Tar-Asphalt - — 1
Misc. Organic Chemicals - - 5
Ammonium Nitrate - - 5
Lime - - 2
Jet Fuel - - 2
Carbonic Acid - - 1
Hydrochloric Acid - - 1
Chlorine - - 1
Nitric Oxide - - 1
Diesel - - 1
Total 54 41 70
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TABLE 35
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
DAVIS STATION
LISTED FOR
Material 1970 1971 1972
Gasoline 4 12 16
Jet Fuel 6 1 -
Tar-Asphalt 17 6 14
Ammunition 30 mm + 1 - -
Detergent 1 - -
Propane 1 1 4
Butane 1 1 2
Diesel 1 - 2
Synthetic Resin 1 - -
Argon 1 - -
Salt 1 - -
Bombs 3 -
Liquid Oxygen - 3 -
Carbon Dioxide 2 -
Hydrogen 1 -
Alcohol - 1 -
Ammonium Hydroxide - 1 -
Misc. Inorganic Chemicals - 7 8
Paint - 2 -
Ammonium Nitrate - 4 6
Antifreeze - 1 -
Lube Oil - 10 12
Hexane - 1 -
Toluene - 2 «
Caustic Potash Solution - - 4
Acetylene - - 2
Sulfuric Acid - - 1
Total 35 59 71
TABLE 36
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR
TULSA STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Bombs 5 4 -
Ammunition 30 mm + 1 1 3
Sodium Alkali 2 - -
Oxygen 1 - -
Misc. Inorganic Chemicals 2 3 5
Synthetic Resin 2 - -
Detergent 2 2 -
Cleaning Solvent 1 - -
Paint 1 1 -
Ammonium Nitrate 4 1 2
Gasoline 4 - 9
Kerosine 1 - -
Lube Oil 2 12 3
Tar-Asphalt 13 2 1
Diesel 1 2 1
Toluene 1 - -
Propane 2 - 2
Butane 2 - -
Misc. Petroleum Products 1 — -
Chemical & Petroleum Waste 1 - -
Sulfuric Acid 1 - 1
Glue-Adhasives - 1 -
Carbon Dioxide - 2 -
Total 50 40 27
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TABLE 37
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR
McALESTER STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Bombs 1 - -
Ammunition 30 mm + 1 2 -
Liquid Oxygen 1 - -
Detergent 1 - -
Paint 1 - -
Ammonium Nitrate 2 3 2
Salt 1 1 1
Gasoline 4 2 7
Rocket Fuel 1 - -
Lime 1 - -
Misc. Organic & Inorganic Chem. - 2 1
Cool Tar Products - 1 -
Sodium Alkali - 1 -
Jet Fuel - 1 1
Asphalt-Tar - 6 -
Propane - 2 1
Synthetic Detergent — 1 -
Glue-Adhesives 1 - 3
Total 18 25 16
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TABLE 38
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR
DURANT STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Misc. Organic Chemicals 2 3 -
Alcohol 1 - -
Chlorox 2 - -
Detergent 1 3 2
Paint 2 3 -
Sulfuric Acid - - 1
Urea 1 1 -
Explosives 1 - -
Gasoline 2 - 5
Lube Oil 2 2 2
Diesel 1 - -
Benzene 1 - -
Propane 1 2 2
Lime 3 - -
Ammunition 30 mm + 1 - -
Ammonium Nitrate 2 1 1
]et Fuel - 2 -
Glues-Adhesives - 6 -
Lime - 3 -
Kerosene - 1 -
Synthetic Resin - 1 -
Nitric Acid - 1 -
Vinegar - 2 1
Asphalt-Tar - - 2
Chromic Acid - - 1
Ammonia - - 1
Total 23 31 18
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TABLE 39
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR 
WOODWARD STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Rockets 1 - -
Ammonium Nitrate 1 1 2
Ammonia 1 - 2
Gasoline 6 B 7
Tar-Asphalt 2 11 2
Natural Gasoline - 1 -
Glue-Adhesives - 1 -
Lube Oils - 10 7
Diesel Oil - 3 2
Propane - 1 1
Liquid Oxygen - - 1
Salt - - 1
Sulfuric Acid - - 1
Misc. Inorganic Chemicals - - 2
Total 11 36 28
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TABLE 40
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR
DRUMRIGHT STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Sodium Alkali 1 - -
Detergent 1 - 1
Gasoline 20 15 16
Jet Fuel 2 - -
Diesel 1 - 2
Gas-Oil 2 - -
Misc. Petroleum Products 1 - -
Chemical & Petroleum Waste 2 - -
Crude Oil - 2 -
Misc. Organic & Inorganic Chem. - 1 2
Lube Oil - 5 3
Tar-Asphalt - 2 2
Butane 2 2 1
Paint - 1 -
Lime - 1 -
Acetylene - - 2
Propane - - 1
Alcohol - - 1
Benzene - - 1
Total 32 29 32
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TABLE 41
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR 
ALTUS STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Liquid Oxygen 1 — 2
Ammonium Nitrate 1 - -
Salt 1 - -
Gasoline 7 7 5
Jet Fuel 15 - 11
Lube Oil 1 4 -
Propane 3 1 3
OP-4 - 0 -
Diesel - 1 2
Uranium - - 1
Acetylene - - 2
Tar-Asphalt - - 1
Total 29 21 27
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TABLE 42
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS. MATERIALS LISTED FOR 
BOISE CITY STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Misc. Organic & Inorganic Chem, 2 1 2
Alcohol 1 - -
Paint 1 - -
Ammonium Nitrate 2 - 3
Glue-Adhesives 1 - -
Gasoline 2 3 1
Tar-Asphalt .2 1 -
Radioactive Material - 1 -
Ammonia - 1 4
Solvent - 1 -
Paint Solvent - 1 -
Lube Oils - 2 1
Diesel Oil - 1 -
Propane - - 2
Bombs - - 2
Photographic Chemicals - - 1
Total 11 12 16
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TABLE 43
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR
VINITA STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Crude Oil 1 2 -
Liquid Nitrogen 1 - -
Coal Tar Products 1 - -
Misc. Organic Chemicals 2 - -
Detergents 2 - -
Insecticides 1 1 -
Ammonium Nitrate 3 1 9
Salt 1 - 1
Gasoline 8 5 5
Lube Oils 2 5 3
Tar-Asphalt 1 17 1
Get Fuel 1 - -
Propane 1 3 2
Sodium & Potassium Alkalies - 1 -
Misc. Inorganic Chemicals - 1 -
Lime - 5 4
Nitroglycerine - 1 -
Sulfuric Acid - - 1
Acetylene - - 3
Explosives - - 1
Diesel Oil - - 2
Phosphorous - - 1
Heir Spray - - 1
Total 25 42 34
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TABLE 44
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR 
WARNER STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Liquid Oxygen 1 - -
Insecticide 1 - -
Rodenticide 1 - -
Gasoline 4 1 2
Tar-Asphalt 3 - -
Ethylene .1 - -
Lube Oils - 1 -
Aviation Gas - 1 -
Benzene - 1 -
Phenyl Ethylene - - 2
Total 11 4 4
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TABLE 45
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
HUGO STATION
LISTED FOR
Material 1970 1971 1972
Gasoline - 3 5
Liquid Oxygen 1 1 1
Acetylene - 1 -
Oil Field Chemicals 
(Treating Compound)
2 1 —
Ammonium Nitrate - 4 1
Salt 1 1
Lube Oils 2 5 1
Diesel Oil - 1 1
Tar-Asphalt - 1 -
Glue-Adhesives 2 2 -
Explosives 1 - 1
Cleaning Fluid 1 - -
Paint 1 - -
Propane - - 1
Sulfuric Acid - - 1
Lime - - 4
Liquid Nitrogen - - 5
Mise, Organic Chemicals - — 2
T otal 10 20 24
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TABLE 46
INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LISTED FOR 
ADA STATION
Material 1970 1971 1972
Ammonium Nitrate 1 - 2
Gasoline 4 - 4
Diesel - - 2
Oxygen - - 1
Paint - - 1
Total 5 0 10
